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Abstract 
This article offers an analysis of three judgements concerning 
the relationship between the Court of Justice of the EU and three 
EU national Constitutional Courts. The judgments, from the Danish 
Supreme Court and the German and Italian Constitutional Courts, 
where occasions where the latter Courts have threatened to oppose 
to distinctive elements of the EU constitutional legal order. These 
elements can ultimately lead to the theorisation of an EU 
constitutional identity. In particular, this article analyses the Dansk 
Industri judgment of the Danish Supreme Court, where the Danish 
court decided not to apply a preliminary ruling of the Court of 
Justice declaring the horizontal direct effect of the principle of non 
discrimination on the ground of age; the OMT judgment of the 
German Constitutional Court, where the German Court, after 
having threatened to declare the ECB OMT programme as ultra 
vires decided to accept the functional interpretation of the principle 
of conferred powers at the conditions established by the Court of 
Justice in the Gauweiler judgment; and the request for a preliminary 
ruling made by the Italian Constitutional Court in the Taricco II 
(M.A.S. and MB) judgment, where the Court of Justice has ruled on 
the balance between the primacy of EU law and the constitutional 
principle of legality. 
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1. Introduction: a case study in constitutional adjudication 
from an EU Constitutional Identity perspective 
The “constitutional” nature of the EU legal order is surely 
one of the most debated and contended results of the gradual 
development of the process of European integration1. The lack of a 
consensus on the constitutional nature of the EU legal order2 is the 
main driver (but hardly the only one)3that fuels the confrontation 
between the EU Court and the national constitutional judges. The 
main reason for the analysis at hand is that, while these three 
decisions are usually representative of the revirement of the 
pluralism of national constitutional identities within the EU, they 
are at the same time supporting the emersion of distinctive 
elements of the EU constitutional legal order. These elements are 
                                                 
1 For some commentators this process is a fragile compromise between the 
different voices within the EU. See i.e. B. de Witte, A. Ott & E. Vos (eds.), Between 
Flexibility and Disintegration, the Trajectory of Differentiation in EU Law (2017). For 
other commentators, the fragmentation of the process of European integration is 
caused by a more serious “system deficiency”. See A. von Bogdandy & M. 
Ioannidis, Systemic deficiency in the rule of law: What it is, what has been done, what 
can be done, 51 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1 (2014).  
2 Historically, in favour see G. F. Mancini, The making of a constitution for Europe, 
26 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 4 (1989), contra D. Grimm, Does Europe need a Constitution?, 1 
Eur. L.J. 3 (1995), at 219. See also J.H.H. Weiler & J. P. Trachtman, European 
Constitutionalism and its discontent, 17 (1) Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. (1997) 354. Recently, 
see K. Tuori, European Constitutionalism (2015), as well as the critique of the book 
made by P.L. Lindseth, The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism, 22 Eur L.J. 
5 (2016), at 696. 
3 The political situation in several Member States makes it more difficult for 
national constitutional judges to back convincingly the process of EU integration, 
as was done in the past, without falling into the trap of “elitism” or even 
“globalism”. Words are swords, and these concepts, widely abused in the current 
political debate, can make the difference in a national political election.  
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part of the conceptualisation of the “EU constitutional identity” that 
is, in the mind of the author, pursued by the Court of Justice as a 
further development of its doctrines of primacy and direct effect of 
EU law. The hypothesis behind this article is that the Court of 
Justice, in identifying through its case law, is advancing certain 
fundamental elements of EU law that are part of the EU 
constitutional identity, but that there is still a lack of a substantial 
theorisation of the latter. This struggle of the Court of Justice for the 
clarification of the extent of an EU constitutional identity 
counterweights and perhaps enriches the pluralism of national 
constitutional identities in Europe.  
The main problem that such an ambitious assumption poses 
is, by far, determining what is the EU constitutional identity. In 
general, identity represents the self-awareness of an individual, and 
the physical, cultural or anthropological characteristics that allow 
for self-determination. As for legal orders, constitutional identity 
joins together the elements that allow for the external and internal 
self-determination of the constitutional legal order.4 However, 
when it comes to the enumeration of the elements that specifically 
belong to the EU constitutional identity, we realize that, as 
Rosenfeld said, it is a rather elusive concept5. Within EU law 
scholarship,6 the EU constitutional identity is composed of values, 
principles and rights that are included in the EU Treaties and, since 
2009 (with the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty), in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as well as 
in the case law of the EU Court of Justice. It is not clear, however, 
                                                 
4 M. Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject, 16 (3-4) Cardozo L.R. 
(1995). Id., The Identity of the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture, 
and Community, (2009).  
5 M. Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject, cit. at 4, 1049-1055. 
6 See L.S. Rossi, Fundamental Values, Principles, and Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon: 
The Long Journey toward an European Constitutional Identity, in Europe(s), Droit(s) 
européen(s) – Liber Amicorumenl'honneur du professeur Vlad Constantinesco”, (2015). 
For a broader picture, encompassing inter alia the relationship between the EU 
and the Member States Constitutional Identity see A. SaizArnaiz & C. Alcoberro 
Llivina (eds.), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (2013), F.X. 
Millet, L’Union Européenne et l’identité constitutionelle des Etats Membres (2013), E. 
Cloots, National Identity, Constitutional Identity, and Sovereignty in the EU, 45 
Netherland J. of Legal Philosophy 2 (2016) and P. Faraguna, Constitutional Identity 
in the EU – A Shield or a Sword?, 18  Ger. L.J. 7 (2017). 
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the extent to which a certain right, principle or value belongs to the 
EU constitutional identity and the extent to which it does not.  
It would be overwhelmingly ambitious to attempt to clarify 
in this article all the elements that belong to such an identity. The 
scope of this work is mainly restricted to the analysis of the reaction 
of three national constitutional courts to the attempt of the Court of 
Justice to affirm certain specific elements, which allow the 
recognition of the EU constitutional identity, at least from a 
scholarly perspective. This happens as a necessary counterpart to 
the restatement of the national constitutional identities in the latter 
judgments. The three specific areas are, first, the principle of non-
discrimination on the ground of age and its horizontal direct effect 
(para.2 of this article), second, the principle of conferred powers 
(para.3) and, third, the protection of the financial interest of the EU 
(para.4). To a certain extent, it is possible to argue that the Court of 
Justice is bringing to another level the process of 
constitutionalisation of specific elements of EU law. That is why a 
certain degree of scepticism from national constitutional judges 
towards these techniques persists, as their national constitutional 
legal orders have already been passed and guided through the 
respective national process of constitutionalisation. The Court of 
Justice still lies in the middle of the path. That is why an analysis of 
the three judgments that follow is needed: it acknowledges the 
central importance of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice for the 
national legal orders, and the fact that the constitutionalisation of 
the process of European integration will be difficult without the 
involvement of the national constitutional courts. 
 
 
2. The Danish Supreme Court and the principle of non-
discrimination (on the ground of age) 
The first judgment to be analysed is the judgment of the 
Danish Supreme Court in Dansk Industri, where the Danish 
Supreme Court refused to apply a preliminary ruling of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union. In order to pursue this analysis, 
we will firstly analyse the judgment of the Court of Justice, in order 
to understand its importance, and, secondly, we will examine the 
elements of the judgment of the Danish Supreme Court rejecting its 
application. 
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2.1 The Court of Justice applies horizontally the principle 
of non-discrimination on the ground of age 
The judgment of the Court concerned the dismissal of a 
Danish worker (Mr. Rasmussen). According to the legislation in 
force in Denmark,7 the dismissed worker was entitled to a 
severance allowance of 1, 2 or 3 months of salary in the event that 
the working relationship is terminated in advance, after 
respectively 12, 15 or 18 years. The decision of the Court of Justice 
was divided in two main parts. In the first part, the Court of Justice 
tackles the issue of the scope of application of the principle of non-
discrimination against the Directive 2000/78/EC8. The Court 
departs from the traditional definition of the principle of non-
discrimination as a general principle of EU law9, which finds its 
roots in the constitutional traditions common to the Member States 
and finally in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, mentioning the 
leading case law in Mangold10and Kücükdeveci11. The Court also 
underlines that “the scope of the protection conferred by the 
directive does not go beyond that afforded to the principle”12, 
which appears to confirm that the principles of EU law have a scope 
of application that is broader than the one of the directive. 
However, the Court stresses that to apply the principle, the case 
should fall within the scope of the prohibition of discrimination in 
Directive 2000/78/EC13. The Court finds that the case falls within 
the scope of the above-mentioned prohibition as it regards the 
dismissal of a worker within the meaning of Article 3.1 c) of 
Directive 2000/78/EC. Therefore, the principle of non-
discrimination on the ground of age should be applied to the 
dispute, which involves two private persons14. In the second part of 
its decision, the Court of Justice has been asked by the national 
Court how to balance the principle of non-discrimination, found to 
be applicable, and the principle of legal certainty and legitimate 
                                                 
7 Paragraph 2 a (1) of the Danish Law on legal relationships between employers 
and employees.  
8 Directive 2000/78/EC, OJ L 303 2000. 
9 Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), case C-441/14, Dansk Industri (DI) [2016], 
para. 22. 
10 CJEU, case C- 555/07, Kücükdeveci [2010]. 
11 CJEU, case C-144/04, Mangold [2004]. 
12 Ibid., para. 23. 
13 Ibid., para. 25. 
14 Mangold, para. 26. 
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expectations, justified, according to the national court, by the 
impossibility to interpret the national legislation according to EU 
law15. The Court accordingly provides the national court with the 
necessary guidance as to discern between consistent interpretation 
and the horizontal application of a general principle.  
The judgment tackles two relevant issues, which makes it 
worthy of in-depth analysis. It represents an answer of the Court of 
Justice to some of the criticism that has been put forward either on 
the opportunity of the horizontal application of the principle of 
non-discrimination on the ground of age16 or on the theoretical 
systematization of the doctrine of direct effect, clarifying the 
distinctive character of horizontal direct effect and of consistent 
interpretation17. In both ambits the judgment is to be warmly 
welcomed, as other than providing a clearer indication of the 
differences between horizontal direct effect and consistent 
interpretation18,it gives the dimension of the importance of the 
principle of non-discrimination in the EU legal order. This article 
will focus mainly on the first part of the decision.  
 
2.2. The “constitutional status” of the principle of non-
discrimination (on the ground of age) 
The previous case law, in particular Mangold and 
Kücükdeveci, introduced a new approach to the application of the 
                                                 
15 Ibid., para. 29. 
16 Criticism towards the horizontal application of general principles has been 
developed at different levels. In literature, see T. Papadopoulos, Criticizing the 
horizontal direct effect of the EU general principle of equality, 17 (4) European Human 
Rights Law Review 437 (2011). However, some of the fiercest challengers of the 
horizontal application have been Advocate Generals of the Court of Justice. See, 
for instance: CJEU, Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in case C-397/01, Pfeiffer 
[2004], para. 46 and in joint cases C-55/07 and C-56/07, Michaeler [2008], para. 22; 
Opinion of AG Kokott in case C-321/05, Kofoed [2007], para. 67; Opinion of AG 
Trstenjak in case C-282/10, Dominguez [2012], paras 127 - 128. AG Trstenjak in 
particular maintains that the horizontal application of general principles would 
be in contrast with the limits towards the application of fundamental rights 
included in Art. 51 (2) of the Charter.  
17 See, for instance, the traditional case law on consistent interpretation, where 
the principle of legal certainty is expressly regarded as a limit towards consistent 
interpretation. For a restatement of this case law, see CJEU, case C-268/06, Impact 
[2008], paras 100 – 101. 
18 See E. Gualco, L. Lourenço, Clash of Titans. General Principles of EU Law: 
Balancing and Horizontal Direct Effect, 1 European Papers 2 (2016). 
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doctrine of direct effect to general principles and secondary EU 
legislation. The usual understanding of their relationship had been, 
before these two seminal decisions, that general principles did not 
enjoy a scope of application broader then the legal instrument to 
which they were linked. As to the nature of the legal instrument 
involved, this had not represented an issue for regulations as well 
as for decisions, in as much as their scope of application was not 
limited by the Treaties. But, as it is quite trite EU law, directives are 
binding “only as to the results to be achieved” by the Member 
States19. This has limited the application and enforcement of 
directives by the national jurisdictions to litigation between the 
State and the citizens (vertical direct effect). Again, the problem 
comes when the judgment involves two private parties, as 
directives cannot generate obligations on individuals, but only 
confer on them rights (horizontal direct effect). The direct 
application of the content of a directive in front of a national Court 
would rather lead to the imposition on individuals of obligations 
that should have been dealt with by the State. The reasoning of the 
Court of Justice in Dansk Industri, accordingly, attempts to reorder 
the rules on the application of the above-mentioned principle to 
litigation involving private parties. The Court clarifies that the 
principle of equal treatment finds its roots in various international 
instruments as well as in the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States. It mentions additionally the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which is recognized as the source of the 
general principle20. Up to this point, the legal reasoning appears 
consistent with the previous in Mangold and Kücükdeveci. The Court 
of Justice, however, takes a few steps further. First, it tackles 
directly and with a systematic approach the issue of the scope of 
application of the Directive and of the principle, clearly stating, “the 
scope of the protection conferred by the directive does not go 
beyond that afforded by the principle”21. Second, the Court openly 
recognizes that the principle of non-discrimination holds a specific, 
distinctive place within the constitutional legal order of the EU. In 
paragraph 26 of the judgment, the Court maintains, given that it 
had already found in previous case law the applicability of 
                                                 
19 Art. 288.3 TFEU. 
20 Dansk Industri (DI), para. 22. 
21 Ibid., para. 23. 
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Directive 2000/78/EC to the Danish legislation in force, the same 
“[A]pplies with regards to the fundamental principle of equality, the 
general principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age being a 
merely specific expression of that principle”22. It is worthy to note that 
Lenaerts theorized a similar approach, which envisages the 
fundamental role of the principle of non-discrimination within the 
EU constitutional order, pointing out that “general principles of EU 
law enjoy a ‘constitutional status’”23. The doctrine is not unanimous 
on this assumption, as other authoritative voices have raised 
different views in the past24. This cannot, however, undermine the 
potential of the innovation that the Court is supplying, opening the 
way to the use of the principle of non-discrimination on the ground 
of age when EU secondary legislation is not applicable. 
 
2.3. The Danish Supreme Court and the “lack of a written 
provision”: A classic case of “ultra vires review?” 
The solution given by the Court of Justice in Dansk Industri 
represents an important systematization of the case law on the 
principle of non-discrimination. Notwithstanding that, the Danish 
Supreme Court decided not to follow the indication provided for 
by the Court and decided not to apply the principle of non-
discrimination. The Danish Supreme Court maintained that it was 
not possible to interpret Danish law in conformity with EU law, 
since, as anticipated in its question for preliminary ruling, this 
would have been regarded as a contra legem interpretation25. The 
main reason for refusing the application of the preliminary ruling 
as resulting from the reasoning of the Danish Supreme Court can 
be summarized as follows: the principle of conferral does not allow 
the Court of Justice to claim the power to apply the principle of non-
discrimination to a litigation between private parties26. In 
                                                 
22 Dansk Industri (DI), para.26. 
23 K. Lenaerts, The Principle of Equal Treatment and the European Court of Justice, Dir. 
Un. Eur. 3 (2013), at 470, K. Lenaerts & J.A. Gutierrez Fons, The Constitutional 
Allocation of Powers and General Principles in EU law, 47 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 6 (2010), 
at 1648. 
24 See, inter alia, V. Skouris, Effet utile Versus Legal Certainty: The Case-law of the 
Court of justice on the Direct Effect of Directives, 17 Eur. Business L.R. 2 (2006), 254. 
25 It is worthy to note that the Advocate General was convinced of the opposite. 
See the Opinion of AG Bot in Dansk Industri (DI), paras 63-64. 
26 S. Klinge, Dialogue or disobedience between the European Court of Justice and the 
Danish Constitutional Court? The Danish Supreme Court challenges the Mangold-
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particular, the Danish Court holds that the Danish Accession 
Agreement to the European Union of 1973 (as well as the 
Preparatory Works of the Danish Parliament) do not contain any 
legal basis to confer to an unwritten EU principle the right to prevail 
over a provision of national law27. This restrictive and literal 
interpretation of the principle of conferred powers is not surprising 
as this is not the first case in which a national Supreme or 
Constitutional Court has refused to follow the indications received 
from the Court of Justice28. However, the argument used seems not 
to take into account that the reasoning of the Court of Justice on 
primacy and direct effect is based on unwritten principles. Should 
it therefore accordingly be assumed that this decision of the Danish 
Supreme Court is a challenge to the primacy of EU law over 
national law? Perhaps the real meaning of the judgment is that the 
Danish Supreme Court wants the Court of Justice to withdraw from 
its Kucukdeveci and Mangold case law and to go back to its 
Dominguez decision.29 In that judgment the Court openly 
recognized that it is for the national Court to decide if it is possible 
to apply national law in conformity with EU law, without imposing 
the horizontal application of the principle of non-discrimination30. 
The Dominguez decision represents, however, a step back in the 
process of the constitutionalisation of EU law through general 
principles that the Court has strongly upheld in the recent past, and 
which clearly represents the approach taken in Dansk Industri. The 
refusal of the Danish Supreme Court to follow the preliminary 
ruling of the Court of Justice is also a sign of the rejection of a 
pluralist approach towards European and national constitutional 
identities: it is not however sufficient to reduce the impact and the 
                                                 
principle, EU Law Analysis (2016), available at 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.it/2016/12/dialogue-or-disobedience-
between.html (lastly visited 1 February 2018). 
27 Danish Supreme Court (DSC), judgment n. 15/2014, [2016], 40. An unofficial 
English translation is available at 
http://www.supremecourt.dk/supremecourt/nyheder/pressemeddelelser/D
ocuments/Judgment%2015-2014.pdf (lastly visited 1 February 2018). 
28 CJEU, case C-399/09, Marie Landtová [2011]. On this point see generally O. 
Pollicino, The New Relationship between National and the European Courts after the 
Enlargement of Europe: Towards a Unitary Theory of Jurisprudential Supranational 
Law?, 29 Yearbook Eur. L. 1 (2010), at 65. 
29 CJEU, case C‑282/10, Dominguez [2012]. 
30 Ibid., para. 44. 
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importance of the decision of the Court in Dansk Industri. The 
authority of the decisions of the Court of Justice does not depend 
simply on the implementation at national level. Others national 
courts can equally apply the judgment and at the same time other 
private parties can rely on the principle of non-discrimination in 
front of national courts, provided that it is not possible to interpret 
national legislation according to EU law. 
 
 
3. The German Constitutional Court and the OMT and 
PSPP programmes: shortcomings on the principle of conferred 
powers 
3.1. The Gauweiler decision and the CJEU functional 
interpretation of the principle of conferred powers 
The Gauweiler31case originated from a complaint brought to 
the Federal Constitutional Court of the German Republic by Peter 
Gauweiler, who was at the time of the action a German member of 
the Bundestag. This decision originates, as widely acknowledged, 
from the notorious OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions) 
programme. In particular, the question for preliminary ruling 
raised by the German Constitutional Court asks, in essence, the 
Court of Justice to assess the validity of the decisions of the 
Governing Council of the European Central Bank of 6 September 
201232 in light of the interpretation of Articles 119 TFEU, 123 TFEU 
and 127 TFEU and of Articles 17 to 24 of Protocol No 4 on the Statute 
of the European System of Central Banks and of the European 
Central Bank33. These decisions regulate a number of the technical 
features regarding the OMT in the secondary sovereign bond 
markets of the Eurozone, as a part of a wider strategy carried out 
by the Eurozone countries in order to react to the sovereign debt 
crisis that has affected some EU Member States since 2008. Briefly 
summarised, since 2012, the ECB has launched a programme to 
buy, under clearly defined circumstances, the sovereign bonds of 
EU Member States that have the Euro as a common currency. This 
                                                 
31 CJEU, case C-62/14, Gauweiler [2015]. 
32 European Central Bank, press release of 6 September 2012, available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html 
(lastly visited 1 February 2018). 
33 Protocol (No 4) on the statute of the European System of Central Banks and of 
the European Central Bank, OJ 2012 C 326. 
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represented a major issue for those Member States34that have 
traditionally been opposed to “sharing the risk” of the sovereign 
debt of States who pay a lower rate interest on their placed 
sovereign debt compared to those Member States paying a 
considerably higher interest rate on their bonds.35 One of the points 
which the judgment concerns is if the decisions taken by the 
Governing Board of the European Central Bank complies with the 
principle of conferred powers36. The above-mentioned principle is, 
according to the Court of Justice37 as well as according to the 
referring Court38, the basic source of the powers of the European 
Union; it is generally accepted that it is not possible to interpret the 
acquis communautaire in a way that is sensible to enlarge the powers 
conferred by the Treaties to the EU institutions39. The real picture 
                                                 
34 Exempli gratia, see the ordoliberal school, majoritarian in Germany, according 
to which the EU institutions should not promote the “moral hazard” of inflation 
through the endorsement of the debt of less-fiscally disciplined States.  
35 See the statistics of the European Central Bank for long-term (10 years) 
government bonds from February 2016 onwards. Available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/financial_markets_and_interest_rates/long
_term_interest_rates/html/index.en.html (lastly visited 1 February 2018). 
36 Article 4.1 and 5.1-2 TFEU.  
37 CJEU, Gauweiler, para. 41. 
38 According to an established case law of the German Constitutional Court 
(GCC), the transfer of sovereign power to supranational organizations should be 
clearly limited. I.e. GCC, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009 2 BvE 
2/08 para. 233-234 [Lisbon Urteil]: “The Basic Law does not authorise the 
German state bodies to transfer sovereign powers in such a way that their 
exercise can independently establish other competences for the European Union. 
It prohibits the transfer of competence to decide on its own competence 
(Kompetenz-Kompetenz)”. See the comment by L.S. Rossi, I principi enunciati dalla 
sentenza della Corte costituzionale tedesca sul Trattato di Lisbona: un'ipoteca sul futuro 
dell'integrazione europea?, 92 Riv. Dir. Int. 4 (2009), at 454. 
39 The “quest for legitimacy” originated by the principle of conferral had a 
considerable impact on the development of the process of EU legal integration. It 
is enough to recall the provision of Article 51.2 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU, included in the text of the Charter in order to ensure that the 
latter “does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers 
of the Union or establish any new power”. The Agreement on the Accession of 
the European Union to the European Convention of Human Rights incurred such 
a fate, where the Court of Justice gave a negative Opinion (CJEU, Opinion 2/13, 
Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [2014]) towards its compliance with the 
Treaties, inter alia on the ground that the powers of the EU institutions (and of 
the Court itself) were likely to be severely affected. Exploring a different field of 
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is, however, much more complicated. While it is true that the 
European Union and its Court of Justice have always strived to 
show deference towards the principle of conferred powers, the 
developments in the case law have showed at least a move towards 
an increasingly “functional” interpretation of the wording of the 
Treaties. The Court has relied on various instruments, as in the 
doctrine of effet utile and implied powers40, in order to carve out of 
the literal meaning of the Treaties an interpretation that could be 
instrumental to the ultimate goal of the constitutional legal order of 
the European Union: the creation of an ever-closer Union. The 
Gauweiler case represents, to a certain extent, a reliable example of 
this functional interpretation. In order to pass the test of the 
principle of conferred powers, the institution involved should 
ensure that the act adopted falls within one of the different 
categories of competences that the States have conferred to the EU. 
In this case, being an act addressed to the acquisition of certain 
typologies of government bonds, the act should have been meant 
to fall within the exclusive competence of EU monetary policy41 and 
not, as claimed by the applicants in the national proceeding, within 
the scope of economic policy42. In order to realize this objective, the 
Court of Justice, while never denying the being subject to the 
principle of conferred powers, interprets43 the extent of monetary 
policy in order to ensure the effective protection of the interests of 
the Member States more affected by the economic crisis. This 
                                                 
EU law, the conferral originated the famous Meroni doctrine (CJEU, case 9/56, 
Meroni v High Authority [1957]) according to which the EU institutions cannot 
delegate to other bodies powers that go beyond the ones which were conferred 
to them by the Treaties.  
40 V. Skouris, Effet utile Versus Legal Certainty, cit. at 24. 
41 CJEU, Gauweiler, para. 42. 
42 It is widely known that while having an exclusive competence in monetary 
policy (Article 3 TFEU), the EU has only the power to coordinate (Article 5 TFEU) 
national economic policies. The boundaries between these two policies are 
however extremely fuzzy. See in this regard M. Waibel, Monetary policy: an 
exclusive competence only by name?, in S. Garben & I. Govaere (eds.), The Division 
of Competences between the EU and the Member States Reflections on the Past, the 
Present and the Future (2017). 
43 In this sense, one could speculate that the Court of Justice has operated a 
balance between the principle of conferred power and the principle of solidarity 
and loyal cooperation, which informs the relationship between the EU and the 
Member States as well as the Member States themselves.  
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interpretation is enabled thanks to the “fuzzy boundary”44that 
separates economic and monetary policy, and of which the Court 
of Justice attempts to take advantage45. The Court of Justice 
accordingly concluded that: “[A] monetary policy measure cannot be 
treated as equivalent to an economic policy measure merely because it may 
have indirect effects on the stability of the euro area”46. The last part of 
the decision, equally relevant from the point of view of the 
functional interpretation that ensures compliance with the principle 
of conferred powers, pertains to the evaluation of the compliance of 
the OMT programme with the provision of Article 123 TFEU47. This 
article forbids the provision of credit facilities by the European 
Central Bank to Member States (in order to exclude the possibility 
of the creation of EU bonds). Once more, the Court of Justice makes 
sure that the compliance with the principle of conferred powers is 
respected by explaining the conditions under which the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) can uphold outright monetary 
transactions: first, the operation should be limited only to the 
purchase of bonds already present in the market48; second, the 
ESCB should ensure that the measure does not have an “effect 
equivalent to that of a direct purchase of government bonds”49; 
third, that “[T]he Governing Council is to be responsible for deciding on 
the scope, the start, the continuation and the suspension of the 
intervention on the secondary market envisaged by such a programme”.50 
The Court of Justice’s interpretation leads to the conclusion that the 
overall measure is not capable of “[L]essen[ing] the impetus of the 
Member States concerned to follow a sound budgetary policy”51. 
 
3.2. The OMT judgment: identity review, ultra vires review 
and “openness to European integration” 
The judgement of the Court of Justice was welcomed with a 
certain degree of scepticism in Germany, and it was unsure52 if that 
                                                 
44 M. Waibel, Monetary policy, cit. at 42, 8. 
45 CJEU, Gauweiler, paras 47-49. 
46 Ibid., para. 52. 
47 Article 123 TFEU. 
48 CJEU, Gauweiler, para. 95. 
49Ibid., para. 97. 
50Ibid., para. 106. 
51 Ibid., para. 129. 
52 See, specifically referring to the identity review, P. Faraguna, Il 
Bundesverfassungsgericht e l'Unione Europea, tra principio di apertura e controlimiti, 
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attitude would have led to an open rejection of the outright 
monetary transaction system. In any case, it appeared most likely 
that the German Constitutional Court would have chosen either to 
approve or to reject the OMT. The German Constitutional Court53, 
however, made a third choice and decided not to declare the 
unconstitutionality of the OMT. The judgment of the German 
Constitutional Court represents a structured answer to the 
functional interpretation of the monetary policy, which belongs to 
what has been defined as the economic constitution54 of the 
European Union and which in this capacity represents an important 
aspect of the constitutional legal order (and identity) of the EU55. 
This is perhaps the reason why the German Constitutional Court 
decided to detail an explanation of the theoretical differences 
between the two concepts. According to the German Constitutional 
Court, it is not enough to recall the principle of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz56 in order to justify the necessity to deviate from the 
project of European integration57, but it is necessary to make 
reference to the concept of the German constitutional identity and 
to the use of the powers that are associated to it. The Karlsruhe 
Court points out that the two concepts against which the EU 
measure shall be assessed are strictly linked, since in the opinion of 
                                                 
DPCE 2 (2016), at 454. See also L.F. Pace, The OMT Case: Institution Building in the 
Union and a (Failed) Nullification Crisis in the Process of European Integration, in L. 
Daniele, P. Simone & R. Cisotta (eds.), Democracy in the EMU in the Aftermath of 
the Crisis (2017). 
53 GCC, Judgment of the Second Senate of 21 June 2016, 2 BvR 2728/13 [OMT 
judgment]. 
54 On this concept see e.g. K. Touri & K. Touri, The Eurozone Crisis (2014), C. 
Joerges, Europe’s Economic Constitution in Crisis and the Emergence of a New 
Constitutional Constellation, 15 Ger. L.J. 5  (2015), at 987 and F. Fabbrini, Economic 
Governance in Europe: Comparative Paradoxes and Constitutional Challenges (2016). 
See also H. Hofmann, A. Pantazatou, The transformation of the European Economic 
Constitution, University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper Series, (2015), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2564156## 
(lastly visited 1 February 2018).  
55 The concept of economic constitution is controversial and openly debatable. It 
resorts to Karlo Tuori concept of the “multiple constitutions” of Europe, as 
detailed in K. Tuori, Multi-Dimensionality of European Constitutionalism: The many 
constitutions of Europe, in K. Tuori (ed.) The Many Constitutions of Europe (2010). 
For a useful literature review on the point, see also H. Hofmann & A. Pantazatou, 
The transformation of the European Economic Constitution, cit. at 54. 
56 GCC, OMT Judgment, para 130. 
57 Ibid., para 141. 
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the German Constitutional Court, the ultra vires review is a 
particular case of the application of the general protection of the 
constitutional identity, but one that should be treated 
independently from another58. 
The German Constitutional Court then details further the 
difference, linking ultra vires review to the use of the principle of 
conferred powers, while referring to the identity review as the 
ultimate limit that cannot be trespassed by the EU institutions.59 
This latter sentence is of special value for the argument 
explained in this article, as it results that the protection of the 
national constitutional identity justifies an action against the 
European Union when it trespasses the competences conferred by 
the Member States; at the same time, the origin of the trespassing 
lies in the affirmation of the specific character of the EU legal order, 
as the German Constitutional Court also openly acknowledges60. 
The reason of the “restraint” of the Karlsruhe Court from digging 
further into the use of the principle of conferred powers lies in the 
principle of “openness to European Integration”. This principle 
finds its roots in the more general principle of “openness to 
international law”61that represents the most visible inheritance of 
the neo-functionalist approach that was (and still is) imbibing 
European Constitutions in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
This principle is also (with others) supporting the reasoning of the 
German Constitutional Court in its case law and in particular in the 
Maastricht and Lisbon decisions where this principle is further 
detailed. In the Lisbon Urteil, the GCC openly recognized that there 
is a functional link between the Basic Law and the process of EU 
integration, and that accordingly the conflict between a 
constitutional provision and EU law should be interpreted in the 
light of this favourable approach62. In the OMT judgment the GCC 
                                                 
58Ibid., para 153. 
59Ibid., para 153.  
60 GCC, OMT Judgment, para 154: “Both the ultra vires and the identity review – 
each constituting independent instruments of review – must be exercised with 
restraint and in a manner open to European integration”. 
61 C. Lebeck, National Constitutionalism, Openness to International Law and the 
Pragmatic Limits of European Integration – European Law in the German Constitutional 
Court from EEC to the PJCC, 7 Ger. L.J. 11 (2006), at 908-909.  
62GCC, Lisbon Urteil, para 225. “The Basic Law calls for European integration and 
an international peaceful order. Therefore, not only the principle of openness 
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confirms, in paragraph 154, the importance of the principle of 
“openness to European integration” and acknowledges that is part 
of the German constitutional identity in as much as the principle of 
conferred powers.  
 
3.3 The (partial) acceptance of the functional interpretation 
of the Principle of conferral in the OMT judgment… 
As has already been pointed out, the German Constitutional 
Court decided to uphold the decision of the Court of Justice in 
Gauweiler. This implied also the compliance of the judgment with 
the Basic Law and the acceptance of the conditions63 underlined by 
the Court of Justice in order to ensure the compliance of the OMT 
programme with the Treaties. However, we should not think that 
this positive decision might represent, on the Karlsruhe side, a 
blank cheque acceptance of the system based on the “openness to 
European integration”. The German Constitutional Court based its 
review of the OMT programme on the principle of conferred 
powers, seen either from the German perspective (Kompetenz-
kompetenz) as well as from the EU perspective (Article 5 TEU). The 
restating of such a traditional element of the identity review 
confirms that, at the present time, an extensive interpretation of the 
Treaties is only limitedly possible in as much as “[T]he finality of the 
European integration agenda may not lead to the de facto suspension of 
the principle of conferral”64. This interpretation of the principle of 
conferral represents the most relevant challenge that the Court of 
Justice has to face in confronting the Karlsruhe review. Separately, 
it should be recognized that the German Constitutional Court 
acknowledges the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and 
consequently accepts its interpretation65, while at the same time 
highlighting that the German government and the Bundestag should 
ensure that the further implementation of the OMT programme 
complies with the conditions described by the CJEU.  
 
                                                 
towards international law, but also the principle of openness towards European 
law (Europarechtsfreundlichkeit) applies.” 
63 GCC, OMT Judgment, paras 199 and 206. 
64 Ibid., para 185. 
65 Ibid., para 156. 
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3.4 …And in the new referral of the German Constitutional 
Court on the Public Sector Purchase Programme of the European 
Central Bank 
A new chapter of this debate was inaugurated by the 
German Constitutional Court in mid-summer 2017. The Karlsruhe 
Court referred a question for preliminary ruling66 to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in order to ascertain if the Public 
Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP)67 of the European Central Bank 
complies with the letter of the Treaties. The preliminary ruling, 
concerning the validity of the programme, asks the Court of Justice 
if the action of the European Central Bank complies with Article 
5TEU (principle of conferral) and Article 123 TFEU (prohibition of 
monetary financing). In essence, the German Constitutional Court 
asks if the purchase of public sector securities conducted by the 
European Central Bank is a turnaround to avoid the application of 
Article 123 TFEU prohibition and consequently goes beyond the 
powers conferred to the EU by the Member States. The German 
Constitutional Court has also asked to the Court of Justice to treat 
the matter according to the expedited preliminary ruling 
procedure68. The Court of Justice, with an order of 18 October 
201769, has refused the request, agreeing, however, to prioritize its 
treatment according to Article 50.3 of the Rule of Procedure. In its 
question for preliminary ruling, the German Constitutional Court 
expresses several doubts about the compatibility of the measure 
with the EU Treaty and affirms: “[T]he resulting risks for the profit and 
loss account of the national central banks would amount to a violation of 
                                                 
66 GCC, order of 18 July 2017, 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 980/16, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 
1651/15. Translation in English not available. See the press release of 15 August 
2017, available at 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/E
N/2017/bvg17-070.html 
67 The PSPP is a European Central Bank programme that is part of the larger 
Expanded Asset Purchase Programme (EAPP). Both programmes are ultimately 
part of the Quantitative Easing (QE). Through these various programmes, the 
European Central Banks is buying securities and bonds in the secondary market 
and is contributing to price stability in the Eurozone.  
68 Art. 105 of the Rule of Procedures of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
OJ L 265 2012. 
69 CJEU, order of the president of the Court in case C-493/17, Weiss [2017]. 
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the constitutional identity within the meaning of Art. 79(3) GG”70. The 
German Constitutional Court is, most likely, asking the Court of 
Justice to rule another OMT judgment, where the Luxembourg 
Court will detail the condition under which the purchases provided 
for by the PSPP are conducted according to the EU Treaties. In this 
case, it must be acknowledged, the German Constitutional Court 
accepts the dimension of the European dialogue between 
Constitutional Courts. At the same time, it does not withdraw from 
its identity review, making explicit that an answer different from a 
clear description of the conditions under which the European 
Central Bank can operate would not be deemed sufficient. The 
Court of Justice will surely need time to reflect on the correct way 
to address a similar challenge.  
As a preliminary conclusion, it seems that the approach 
adopted by the German Constitutional Court in the Gaweiler/OMT 
judgment and in the reference for the preliminary ruling in the 
Weiss/PSPP judgment is similar: both judgments are expression of 
the ultra vires and identity review of the German Constitutional 
Court. However, contrary to the Danish Supreme Court judgment, 
they are not opposing to the coexistence of the pluralism of the 
national constitutions and of the attempt by the Court of Justice of 
the determination of the distinctive elements of the EU 
constitutional legal order. At the same time, the dimension of the 
challenge to the Court of Justice remains. The second judgment in 
particular requires a clear answer from the Court of Justice: an 
answer that can lead to the reinforcement of the functional 
interpretation of the principle of conferred powers as a distinctive 
element of the EU constitutional legal order that the Court of Justice 
has pronounced in Gauweiler.  
 
 
4. The Italian Constitutional Court and the protection of 
the financial interests of the EU 
Here, we move towards the analysis of the last decision: the 
request for preliminary ruling lodged by the Italian Constitutional 
Court on the interpretation of the seminal Taricco judgment. From 
an analysis of the question posed we can draw the conclusion that 
                                                 
70 GCC, order of 18 July 2017, Para 131. Translation is courtesy of the press release 
of the German Constitutional Court. 
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the Taricco II (M.A.S and M.B.)71decision represents another 
occasion where the Court of Justice has been asked to rule on the 
conflict between a national constitutional value (the principle of 
legality) and a distinctive element of the EU constitutional legal 
order (the primacy of EU law).  
 
4.1. Taricco hits back: the decision of the Court of Justice 
and the second preliminary ruling 
The decision of the Court of Justice in Taricco72 has raised a 
number of concerns and reactions although mainly within Italian 
legal scholarship.73The Court dealt with the criminal proceedings 
against an Italian national, who was held guilty, inter alia, for a 
fraud that was in principle likely to have an impact on the financial 
interests of the European Union. The field of the financial interests 
of the EU stands at a crossroads between European criminal, tax 
and constitutional law, and is a clear example of the trend of EU 
law towards an interdisciplinary approach. The importance of the 
case is linked to the fact that the Court of Justice decided, in order 
to ensure the effective protection74 of the financial interests of the 
European Union, to interpret the national legislation about the 
limitation period associated to the conclusion of a criminal 
proceeding in order to avoid the crime being statutory-barred. In 
essence, what the Court of Justice has done is to affirm the 
procedural nature of the limitation period, rather than substantial 
as it is according to the case law of the Italian Constitutional 
Court75, in order to confer on Article 325 TFEU direct effect and to 
disapply the national provision that was impeding the prosecution 
of the crime against the financial interests of the EU. The case 
eventually came to the attention of the Italian Constitutional 
                                                 
71 CJEU, Case C-42/17, M.A.S. and M.B. [2017]. 
72 CJEU, case C-105/14, Taricco [2015]. 
73See e.g. R. Mastroianni, Supremazia del diritto dell’Unione e “controlimiti” 
costituzionali: alcune riflessioni a margine del caso Taricco, Diritto penale 
contemporaneo, (2016); F. Viganò, Il caso Taricco davanti alla Corte costituzionale: 
qualche riflessione sul merito delle questioni, e sulla reale posta in gioco, in A. Bernardi 
(ed.), I controlimiti. Primato delle norme europee e difesa dei principi costituzionali 
(2017); E. Cannizzaro, Sistemi concorrenti di tutela dei diritti fondamentali e 
controlimiti costituzionali, in A. Bernardi (ed.), cit. at 61. 
74 Art. 325 TFEU. 
75 M. Bassini, Prescrizione e principio di legalità nell’ordine costituzionale europeo. Note 
critiche a Taricco, Consulta Online 96 (2016). 
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Court76, which was asked, by the Corte di Cassazione, to rule on the 
compliance of the interpretation of the Court of Justice with the 
Italian Constitution. This judgment is the expression of a specific 
kind of review that, to a certain extent, is analogous to the identity 
review and the ultra vires review of the German Constitutional 
Court: the doctrine of counterlimits, in the wording of the Italian 
Constitutional Court77. In the case of the application of the 
counterlimits theory, the Italian Constitutional Court analyses 
either if the Court of Justice has exceeded the powers conferred by 
the Treaties and/or if the limit of the protection of the core of 
constitutional rights has been trespassed by the exercise of these 
powers.  
 
4.2. The conditions for the application of direct effect to a 
Treaty provision 
The question of the application of direct effect to Article 325 
TFEU brings us to the core of EU law. According to a consistent case 
law of the Court of Justice78, in order to be directly effective a 
provision of primary law should be sufficiently detailed, precise, 
and unconditional (not subjected to further implementation)79.The 
Treaties provides the necessary coverage to justify the direct effect 
of primary EU law (in particular of directives, regulations and 
decisions)80. There is, however, a lack of provisions regulating the 
direct effect of the articles of the Treaties themselves. This is partly 
linked with the specific character of the Treaties, which, being 
clearly addressed to the States, should not be able in principle to 
confer to an individual certain rights that can be relied on in front 
of the national courts. On the other side, since the Defrenne case 
law81, the Court of Justice has retained the right to determine if 
certain provisions of the Treaties meet the elements necessary to be 
                                                 
76 Italian Constitutional Court (ICC), order n. 24/2017 of 23 November 2016. 
77 I.e. CJEU, case 183/73, Frontini [1973], para. 9. 
78 CJEU, case 26-62, Van Gend en Loos [1963].  
79 See P. Craig, The Legal Effect of Directives: Policy Rules and Exceptions, 34 Eur. L.R. 
3 (2009), at 349. 
80Art. 288 TFEU, paras 2-3-4. 
81 Where it was recognized the direct effect of Article 118 TEC, regulating the 
right of women and men to be paid equally. CJEU, case 43-75, Defrenne v Sabena 
(II) [1976]. 
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applied directly, either vertically or horizontally82. The 
circumstances of this case differ from the ones usually related to the 
application of direct effect. In general, vertical direct effect is 
associated with directives, and the rule behind this utilisation is that 
directives cannot be used in order to impose obligations on 
individuals. The factual circumstances of Taricco, however, go to the 
detriment of the individuals concerned, in the sense that they force 
the State to prosecute a crime that was not, according to national 
legislation, meant to be prosecuted. The Court of Justice, relying on 
its exclusive jurisdiction on the conferral of direct effect to Treaties 
provisions, decided to apply Art. 325 TFEU although the Treaty 
provision was not intended to place a burden on the citizen but 
rather on the Member State83. It could be argued however that the 
primary concern of the Court of Justice is not simply the affirmation 
of direct effect, but rather an attempt to proceed towards the 
harmonisation of the general part of criminal law84. In this case, the 
decision of the Court in Taricco gains a different relevance and 
importance, as the objective of the harmonization of criminal law is 
as important as the rights of the individuals involved in the same 
proceeding. Again, as has been pointed out85, another explanation 
can be found in the specific character of the application of direct 
effect: it is true and noticeable that the literal provision of the 
Treaties lacks the conditions necessary to be applied. At the same 
time, it is equally true that the obligation in Article 352 is detailed, 
precise and unconditional enough: it imposes on the Member States 
a requirement to reach the objective of the “efficient protection” of 
the financial interests of the EU. In the present case it looked quite 
evident that the Italian authorities were not able to ensure this 
objective.  
                                                 
82 However, differently from Dansk Industri, the present case does not involve a 
controversy between two individuals. See supra, para. 2.  
83 Ensuring the “effective protection” of the financial interests of the European 
Union is, in fact, an obligation which should bear on the Member State. 
Otherwise, the principle of the legitimate expectations of the citizens of that 
Member State might be seriously undermined.  
84See the comment of F. Rossi, L'obbligo di disapplicazione in malam partem della 
normativa penale interna tra integrazione europea e controlimiti. La problematica 
sentenza Taricco della Corte di giustizia, 17 Rivista Italiana di Diritto e Procedura 
Penale 1, (2016), at 373. 
85 See P. Faraguna, Il caso Taricco, I controlimiti in tre dimensioni, in A. Bernardi 
(ed.), I controlimiti, cit. at 72, 359. 
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4.3. Order n. 24/2017 and decision C-42/17: a particular case 
of dialogue between openness and resistance 
In its question86, the Italian Constitutional Court essentially 
asks the Court of Justice if the early decision of the Court of Justice 
in Taricco is to be applied as well if affects the constitutional 
identity87 and the supreme principles of the Italian constitutional 
legal order88. As some scholars have pointed out89, the overall style 
of the question of the Italian Constitutional Court is drafted as a 
meta-dialogue: the Italian judge, adopting a rather conciliatory 
approach90, describes the necessity of a dialogue through a legal 
instrument that is typical of the dialogue between the 
Constitutional Courts. The Italian Constitutional Court asks the 
Court of Justice to interpret Taricco in a way that is compatible with 
the Italian constitutional legal order. However, behind this formal 
openness, it is clear that the Italian Constitutional Court is 
threatening to declare a restatement of the first Taricco decision as 
trespassing the limits of the powers conferred by the Treaties to the 
Court, and ultimately violating an essential element of the Italian 
                                                 
86 Two interesting contributions explain (in English) why the Taricco order is 
especially important for the Italian and European legal order. See P. Faraguna, 
The Italian Constitutional Court in re Taricco: “Gauweiler in the Roman Campagna”, 
VerfBlog (2017) available at http://verfassungsblog.de/the-italian-
constitutional-court-in-re-taricco-gauweiler-in-the-roman-campagna/ (lastly 
visited 1 February 2018). D. Tega, Narrowing the Dialogue: The Italian Constitutional 
Court and the Court of Justice on the Prosecution of VAT Frauds, ICONnect blog 
(2017), available at http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/02/narrowing-the-
dialogue-the-italian-constitutional-court-and-the-court-of-justice-on-the-
prosecution-of-vat-frauds/ (lastly visited 1 February 2018). 
87 The Italian Constitutional Court uses the expression “constitutional identity” 
in as much as the German Constitutional Court uses the word “limits” to describe 
its identity review: this might be interpreted as a sign that the national 
Constitutional Courts are striving to find a consistent and uniform way to review 
the decisions of the Court of Justice. See para. 6 of the Order. 
88 Paras 10-11 of the Order. 
89 See L. Gradoni, Il dialogo tra Corti, per finta, Sidiblog (2017), available at 
http://www.sidiblog.org/2017/02/08/il-dialogo-tra-corti-per-finta-4/ (lastly 
visited 1 February 2018) and D. Gallo, La primazia del primato sull’efficacia (diretta?) 
del diritto UE nella vicenda Taricco, Sidiblog (2017), available at 
http://www.sidiblog.org/2017/02/25/la-primazia-del-primato-sullefficacia-
diretta-del-diritto-ue-nella-vicenda-taricco/ (lastly visited 1 February 2018). 
90 It is worthy to recall that, contrary to what the German Constitutional Court 
and the Danish Court have done, the Italian Constitutional Court recognizes the 
primacy of EU law. See para. 6 of the Order. 
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constitutional identity. The Court of Justice, differently from the 
early Opinion of its Advocate General91, decided to answer to this 
question in a way that attempts to strike a balance between a 
constitutional right and the primacy of EU law92. 
Instead of resorting to its case law on national constitutional 
identities (as inSayn Wittgenstein93and in Von Bogendorff94), the 
Court openly recognizes that the application of EU law over 
national law is not without limits95. It does so through a twofold 
reference to EU and national law. In first place, the Court points out 
that the field of VAT fraud lies within the EU-Member States shared 
competences96, and that, accordingly, the margin of discretion of 
the Member States depends on the level of harmonization at EU 
level97. Given that the EU rules on harmonization of VAT fraud 
were not in force at the moment of the initiation of the criminal 
proceeding, “The Italian Republic was thus, at that time, free to provide 
that in its legal system those rules, like the rules on the definition of 
offences and the determination of penalties, form part of substantive 
criminal law”98. The Court also recalls that the principle of legality is 
equally important for EU as well as for national law, since it is 
enshrined in Art. 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
as well as being part of the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States99. With this sentence the Court avoids referring to 
the concept of constitutional “identity”, resorting to the more 
                                                 
91 The Opinion of AG Bot in Taricco II, released on 18 July 2017, takes a different 
stance. The Advocate General reaffirms the primacy of EU law, ultimately 
recalling the duty of the Italian Constitutional Court to answer to the national 
court in the sense of ordering to disapply the limitation period, thus violating the 
constitutional interpretation of the criminal law provision in Italian law. See 
Opinion of Advocate General Bot, case C-42/17, M.A.S. and M.B. [2017]. Since, 
however, Opinions of the Advocate Generals are not binding on the Court, this 
did not impede the different answer given by the Court of Justice. 
92 CJEU, Case C-42/17, M.A.S. and M.B. [2017] [Taricco II]. 
93 CJEU, case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein [2011]. On Sayn Wittgenstein and the 
case law of the CJEU on national constitutional identities see the clear description 
provided by G. Di Federico, Identifying national identities in the case law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union, 4 Dir. Un. Eur. (2014), at 769. 
94 CJEU, case C-438/14, Von Wolffersdorff [2016]. 
95 CJEU, Taricco II, para. 41.  
96 Art. 4 (2) TFEU. 
97 CJEU, Taricco II, para. 43. 
98 Ibid., para. 45. 
99 CJEU, Taricco II, paras 53-54. 
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relational and plural concept of “common constitutional 
traditions”100. Although the language of common constitutional 
traditions is less prone to conflict than the one of constitutional 
identity, it is undoubted that the Court of Justice is underlining the 
specific importance of the principle of legality in the EU and 
national legal orders. The Court of Justice, with this decision, tries 
to kill two birds with one stone. Instead of paving the way to a 
conflict between a constitutional right and a provision of the 
Treaties, the Court recognizes that, as a way of exception, the 
principle of legality, common to EU and Member States legal 
orders, might authorize the disapplication of a Treaty provision. 
Concurrently the Court of Justice demonstrates commitment to 
acknowledge the pluralism of the interpretations of rights and 
principles that are at the core of national constitutional identities. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Approaching the end of this work, a first conclusion might 
be that the different judgments analysed share a common approach: 
they are expression of the creative tension between the pluralism of 
the national constitutional identities and the emersion of an EU 
constitutional identity. In the end, the author resisted the 
temptation to label every single Constitutional Court with an 
adjective (“good”, “bad” or “ugly”), which would have been 
ultimately either simplistic or unjust. The Italian, German and 
Danish judgments are at the same time troublesome and 
challenging, as seen from the perspective of the Court of Justice. 
Certain approaches might raise more doubt than others in the mind 
of an EU law scholar (see i.e. the Danish judgement) but this does 
not mean that they cannot be the object of a contextual 
interpretation. The Danish judgement, while representing perhaps 
the strongest rejection of a distinctive element of the EU 
constitutional legal order, as the direct effect of general principles, 
will challenge the Court of Justice to explain in a more convincing 
way (at least from the perspective of the national courts) its doctrine 
of direct effect. A similar remark can be made with reference to the 
                                                 
100 F. Fabbrini & O. Pollicino, Constitutional identity in Italy: European integration as 
the fulfilment of the Constitution, EUI Department of Law Working Papers n. 6, 
(2017). On this point see also M. Cartabia, Of bridges and walls: the “Italian style” of 
constitutional adjudication, 8 Italian J. of Pub. L. 1 (2016). 
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Taricco II judgment, where the Italian Constitutional Court asked 
the Court of Justice to clarify its previous Taricco case law. The 
tension occurring is accordingly a by-product of the process of 
constitutionalisation of the EU legal order. The good news is that 
no one among the different Courts is openly opposing the elements 
of the EU constitutional identity101.The bad news is that, as showed 
in the Taricco II decision, there might be little space for further 
clarification from the Court of Justice since concerns of another ultra 
vires declaration from another national constitutional court are 
high. In this sense, the solution might be threefold. First, the time is 
come for the Court of Justice to provide a stronger theoretical 
background on the value and the meaning of the distinctive 
elements of the EU constitutional legal order. A first occasion has 
been the Taricco II decision, where the Court of Justice, albeit not 
referring openly to Art. 4 (2) of the TEU102, has however recalled 
that the EU and Member States share common constitutional 
traditions that can ultimately cause the disapplication of a Treaty 
provision. Second, the Court of Justice might consider developing 
further the Gauweiler functional interpretation of the principle of 
conferred powers (and in this case the occasion might be provided 
for by the pending PSPP judgment), another distinctive element of 
the EU constitutional legal order. Third, the Court of Justice of the 
EU should recall that, contrary to the national constitutional courts, 
it does not enjoy the possibility of upholding a “reverse preliminary 
ruling”103 and that its exposure to the review of its national 
counterparts is permanent. This should suggestthat the Court of 
                                                 
101 It is also interesting to note that even the German Constitutional Court, which 
consistently stated in its case law that a further transfer of competences to the 
European Union is not admissible under the German Constitution (Kompetenz-
kompetenz) without a formal revision of the Treaties, has recognized in the OMT 
judgment that the “principle of the openness to European Integration” embodied 
in the German Constitution might, under certain conditions, allow also for the 
approval of a measure which reflects a functional interpretation of the principle 
of conferred powers. 
102 As it was suggested by L.S. Rossi, How Could the ECJ Escape from the Taricco 
Quagmire?, VerfBlog (2017), available at http://verfassungsblog.de/how-could-
the-ecj-escape-from-the-taricco-quagmire/ (lastly visited 1 February 2018) where 
the author proposes an operative part for the judgment of the Court of Justice in 
Taricco II.  
103 This solution would require a modification of the Treaties. At the same time, 
it would not be welcomed by the Court itself as an acceptable solution, since it is 
likely to affect the autonomy of the institution.  
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Justice adopt the particularly cautious approach of the Taricco II 
decision, taking into account the fact that most of the national 
constitutional rights are also fundamental rights at EU level. While 
this does not go as far as to the Europeanisation of counterlimits 
suggested by certain authors104, it is however the formal recognition 
that the Court of Justice can tolerate a violation of one of the 
elements on which the EU legal order is based if it is justified by the 
exigency to protect a fundamental right that belongs to the common 
constitutional traditions of the EU and its Member States. Overall, 
the tension between pluralism and unity described in these 
judgments leads the interpreter into an unknown dimension. 
Unless the Court of Justice further clarifies on the meaning of the 
distinctive elements of the EU constitutional legal order, the 
atmosphere will continue to recall the surrealist ambiance of Sergio 
Leone’s cinema: the main characters will keep on staring at each 
other, waiting for the Court of Justice to make the first move. 
 
                                                 
104 See A. Bernardi, I controlimiti al diritto dell’Unione ed il loro discusso ruolo in 
ambito penale, in A. Bernardi (ed.), cit. at 72. 
